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Three recent Canadian public health crises present an illustration of both the opportunities
for reform and the challenges that may impede progress and public health renewal in
federalist nations. While the three crises examined exposed serious flaws in emergency
preparedness and fuelled demands for vital public health reform, evidence indicates that
fundamental challenges have not been addressed and may have even heightened over the
last decade given a move to “open federalism” and the significant fiscal impacts of ongoing
austerity measures. With future pandemics inevitable, we identify the missed opportunities
to optimize Canada’s emergency response capacity and procedures and examine the
seemingly intractable barriers of federalism and path dependency thinking that continue to
impede learning and reform and ultimately undermine effective disaster management

I

n Canada, authority for public health management and emergency response is shared
between all three levels of government: federal, provincial, and municipal. This creates a
complex public policy environment that presents significant challenges most visibly and often
distressingly in the context of emergency response and public health renewal. Three recent
Canadian public health crises present an illustration of both the opportunities for reform and
the challenges that may impede progress and public health renewal in other federalist nations
such as the United States.
In 2003, Canada saw a provincial outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS). Following the outbreak, scathing criticism of Canada’s health units emerged. SARS
had tested Canada’s public health systems, showing them to be “woefully inadequate”
(Bretscher et al. 2010). The serious challenges presented by SARS were seen as a rare
opportunity to reform and invest in public health in Canada and ensure that vital emergency
preparedness systems were up to the task and prompted major reforms and significant
economic investment across all three levels of government. In just a few years, Canada
suffered two more public health emergencies: the 2008 listeriosis outbreak and the 2008-2009
H1N1 novel influenza pandemic. In spite of major institutional reforms and significant
investment, Canada’s public health systems were again chastised for serious deficiencies,
forcing critics to conclude that the hard fundamental lessons from 2003 had not been learned
and addressed.
Our paper draws on numerous inquiries and reports that have revealed a recurring
pattern of managerial and institutional frailties including poor coordination, integration and
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communication; weak leadership; inadequate strategic planning, monitoring and surveillance;
bureaucratic inflexibility and lack of adaptive capacity; and blurred lines of authority and
flawed procurement and vaccine supply chains. While it is possible to analyse and explain
the findings using a range of organisational and public management theories, our main
contention is that the failings highlighted are largely symptomatic of the deeper tensions and
politics generated by Canadian federalism. Consequently we focus on the seemingly
intractable challenges that federalism presents for emergency preparedness in the context of
preparing for future pandemic threats.
By analyzing three of Canada’s major public health emergencies of the last decade,
we also identify opportunities for public health reform. In particular, we highlight the need
for increased federal leadership and oversight in public health emergencies; the need for
continued economic investments, but with enhanced oversight; and the development of
coordinated intergovernmental relationships and communication protocols that transcend
strict jurisdictional boundaries.
In advocating for these reforms, we also recognize and argue that in Canada the
challenges of federalism may have heightened over the last decade in tandem with the federal
government’s adoption of a laissez–faire approach to intergovernmental relations under the
current Prime Minister, Stephen Harper. Coined “open federalism” it has also been labeled
“absentee federalism” by critics due to the Harper government’s reluctance to play a national
coordinating role. Furthermore, the fiscal resource base of the federal public health agency
has been severely impacted by the government’s ongoing austerity measures and media and
public fears concerning the threat of pandemics such as avian flu appears to have waned.
Consequently, ten years after SARS provided a “window” for substantive reform of public
health and emergency management in Canada, the opportunity to learn from previous
mistakes and adapt for future emergencies appears to have diminished substantially.
With future pandemics inevitable, we identify the missed opportunities to optimize
Canada’s emergency response capacity and procedures for emergency reform, and examine
the significant barriers presented by federalism, political ideology and path dependent
thinking that continue to impede learning and undermine effective emergency preparedness
and response. While focused on Canada, we believe the paper may have wider implications
for the latest multilateral North American Plan for Animal and Pandemic Influenza
(NAPAPI) drafted in 2012. Given the extremely high level of integration between Canada
and the United States and between Mexico and the United States, the launch of a North
American pandemic plan makes obvious sense. That said if collaboration and cooperation
between levels of government in a single country appears to be unrealistic it does not bode
well for international agreements that have yet to be tested.
We begin by examining Canadian federalism and the constraints and challenges that
this poses for emergency preparedness and response. We then outline and analyze the three
case studies, drawing out the key implications and themes, and conclude by assessing the
prospects and options for future reform.
FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN CANADA
In Canada, responsibility for public health and emergency response is shared
between federal, provincial-territorial, and municipal governments. These complex
jurisdictional and institutional arrangements for public health can be traced back to the broad
and decentralized nature of providing public health across a geographically massive country
and the lack of explicit jurisdiction given when such lines of authority were drawn in the
Constitution Act, 1867.
Canada’s geographical challenges and constitutional constraints have given rise to
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institutional and organizational tensions within the overall governance structure. In addition
to collaborative working relationships that extend “vertically,” between the federal,
provincial (state) and municipal levels of government, there is also evidence of “horizontal”
governance in Canada’s political institutions. Many organizations work in tandem with, and
alongside, other peer organizations at the same level of government. For example, the Public
Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) works alongside the federal department Health Canada on
many issues related to health. In addition, safety issues related to food are handled by three
federal entities: the Canada Food Inspection Agency, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, and
Health Canada. In this way fragmentation in vertical governance is further accompanied by
fragmentation in horizontal governance (Bakvis and Skogstad 2007). Consequently, the
division of responsibility across multiple organizations at the same level of government
further compounds the complexity of assigning responsibility or authority for many public
health issues.
The polycentric and disparate context of health in Canada should not be
underestimated. As Fierlbeck notes, “if one area of public administration best exemplifies
the interdependent nature of modern governance, it is that of public health (Fierlbeck 2010,
2). This presents a number of specific challenges for policymaking and coordination when it
comes to planning for emergency preparedness and response.
Typically, interdependence creates a governance structure in which multiple actors
share responsibility for outcomes. This sharing can lead to difficulties defining tasks and
developing clear lines of responsibility and accountability. Above all else, effective
emergency responses demand seamless, expedient actions facilitated by a clear chain of
command. A lack of clarity and ill-defined roles will necessarily hinder well-coordinated
responses and can instill complacency based on the oft- mistaken belief that “someone else”
will deal with the crisis. The second main challenge to policymaking presented by federalism
concerns the impact of interdependence on decision-making. As decentralized governance
structures grant authority and status to a multitude of potential actors, they can also render
the creation of a gridlock effect termed a “joint decision trap” by McDougall (2009). When,
as a result of jurisdictional considerations, no level of government is able to act alone without
formal agreement from all governments, McDougall predicts that “default decision-making”
and “frozen institutional arrangements” will typically result (2009).
Three recent public health crises underline key challenges presented by these
institutional arrangements for emergency response in Canada and provide excellent case
studies: the 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the reform
efforts made in its wake, the handling of the 2008 outbreak of listerioris, a foodborne illness,
and, third, the 2008-2009 novel flu pandemic, H1N1.We address them in chronological order,
as (in addition to being interested in each individual case), we are also looking to capture the
degree of learning, adaptation and reform that resulted over the entire period.
CRITICAL INCIDENTS: THREE “MOMENTS OF TRUTH”
2003: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS):
The first cases of SARS among humans emerged in a southern province of China in
the winter of 2002. By 2003, SARS had spread not only to neighbouring Hong Kong, but
also to Canada. In July 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that Canada
had seen 251 probable cases of SARS and 43 deaths had been attributed to the disease
(Naylor, Chantler, and Griffiths 2004).
While the actual outbreak of SARS was unavoidable, criticism surfaced regarding
aspects of the response. Doubt arose that perhaps it could have been contained earlier. As a
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result of perceived failures, a key question emerged: did the failures simply reflect the
inherent difficulties in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from catastrophes? Or
were the impacts of SARS the result of oversights or neglect that could have been avoided?
Perhaps testament to suspicions of the latter, three major committees were formed, each
charged with producing their own authoritative report. These were: the National Advisory
Committee on SARS and Public Health (The Naylor Report 2003); the Ontario Expert Panel
on SARS and Infectious Disease Control (The Walker Report); and the Ontario SARS
Commission (The Campbell Report, 2004-2006).
All three of the reports commissioned after SARS concluded that the response was
less than adequate. Their conclusions identified elementary mistakes and oversights that were
deemed to be unreasonable for an advanced health care system to fall victim to. As stated in
the Campbell Report, “SARS showed Ontario’s central public health system to be
unprepared, fragmented, poorly led, uncoordinated, inadequately resourced, professionally
impoverished, and generally incapable of discharging its mandate” (Campbell 2004).
Investigators focused on the processes and systems established to deal with the outbreak.
Evidence provided to the investigators confirmed that mistakes were made and that the
devastation wrought by SARS was not merely the result of the inherent difficulties in
containing such an outbreak. Rather, as the Campbell Commission concludes, “it is likely
that [Toronto’s first outbreak of] SARS could have been contained more quickly and with
less damage had the right systems been in place in Ontario” (Campbell 2004).
The Campbell Commission alone highlights a lengthy list of twenty-three major
problems faced over the course of the SARS outbreak in Toronto. These problems range
from the declining investment in public health, a lack of transparency, a lack of preparedness,
a lack of laboratory capacity, inadequate infectious disease information systems, blockages
of vital information, lack of central expertise, and poor coordination with the federal
government (Campbell 2004).
Similar criticisms were echoed in the other two reports. The jurisdictional issues also
featured prominently in subsequent academic papers and reports:
In addition to the lack of capacity and planning in the health system to deal with SARS,
Ontario faced serious jurisdictional issues. Who was responsible for government’s
response to the crisis? The Ministry of Health and Long Term Care and the
Commission for Public Health are legally responsible for health emergencies, while
the Ministry of Public Security and Safety and the Commissioner for Public Safety are
legally responsible for emergencies affecting the entire province. In the ex post
analysis of the SARS crisis, jurisdictional conflicts made it evident that the
government needed clear lines of authority for decision making. (Bretscher et al. 2010)
The World Health Organization also commented on Canada’s relatively poor performance in
containing and dealing with SARS, noting that the major shortcoming was a “lack of
intergovernmental communication” (Wilson and MacLennan 2005). A key finding was that,
during SARS, the province of Ontario did not readily communicate data to the federal
government because there was no legislation that obligated them to do so, and there was much
confusion regarding the impact of privacy rights on information sharing between the
provinces and the federal government (Campbell 2004).
Lacking clear lines of authority, central direction and leadership, many government
officials became involved and several acted as spokespeople to the media on behalf of
Canada, often presenting conflicting or confusing information. The absence of clear direction
was unsettling not only for the population, but it also caused “many local Medical Officers
of Health [to feel] abandoned during SARS, devoid of support and guidance” (Campbell
2004).
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Compounding these difficulties, Ontario had no plan for pandemic response in place
at the time of the SARS outbreak (Campbell 2004). Pandemic plans establish a process for a
staged response and are of value in establishing ultimate authority for the management of
outbreaks, a chain of command that was, in fact, never clarified or established during the
SARS outbreak.
In the wake of SARS, and the resulting investigations, there emerged a growing
consensus among government officials that Canada’s public health systems were not up to
the task and improvements were needed. The shock and fall-out from SARS prompted many
to focus on much-needed public health renewal in Canada. According to one report published
by the federal department, Health Canada: 1
The lessons learned from SARS are critical pieces of information for determining
the improvements needed in Canada’s public health system…the knowledge gained
from SARS should help Canada put in place a public health system that will be
capable of not only dealing with the next outbreak, but the next pandemic. (Public
Health Agency of Canada 2003).
A desire to update and strengthen public health was evident. Many social scientists have long
spoken about the impacts of “focusing events” – sudden catastrophes, often unexpected, that
may advance policy issues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cobb and Elder 1983; Kingdon
1995). In this way, the devastating circumstance of the SARS outbreak functioned in this
manner - it highlighted problems demanding attention. Subsequently, this outbreak
galvanized government resources, political will, and public health investment.
By putting public health reform firmly on the agenda, SARS would serve as a
catalyst for the many reforms that would occur over the next few years. Major changes did
occur after the 2003 outbreak: for example, the federal budget of February 2004 committed a
sizeable 665 million dollars (CAD) to the task of strengthening the country’s public health
system. Second, the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) was established on September
24, 2004 to serve as the main agency responsible for public health in Canada and to provide
federal leadership in health programs, research, surveillance, and emergency response. Third,
a new intergovernmental mechanism termed the “Pan-Canadian Public Health Network” was
formed to support the mitigation of public health challenges. The network is intended to link
federal, provincial, and territorial health operations, assist during emergencies, collaborate on
day-to-day operations of public health and provide advice and reporting to the Deputy
Ministers of Health. The network’s objectives demonstrated considerable potential because
they were based on an understanding of the challenges posed by federalism and offered a
concrete, realistic solution to the diffuse system.
In spite of the reforms made, a number of important changes suggested in the reports
were overlooked that could, and perhaps should, have been made. For example, legislation
that would obligate the provinces to share health surveillance information with the federal
government was not developed in the years after the SARS outbreak. Such data collection is
necessary to undertake effective national health surveillance and to help ensure early
detection of emerging outbreaks and to trigger early interventions.
In addition, fundamental issues in Canada’s emergency management legislation
were not amended after the SARS outbreak. Current regulations are written in such a way
that the federal government is not permitted to unilaterally engage in disaster relief if the
emergency is contained within one province; intervention is only permissible once the
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disaster has already spread across a provincial border (Wilson 2006). As an area of
policymaking, there are key aspects of pandemic response that justify a centralized approach:
aggressive early intervention is required, significant resources are needed, and the
consequences could be significant for both Canadian citizens and international citizens “if a
province sought to address the challenge on its own and failed” (Wilson 2006, 38). However,
even after the SARS crisis, legislation was not amended to give the federal government the
authority to intervene. Such inaction seemingly reflects the reluctance of Canadians to
engage in reforms that involve constitutional change or changes in entrenched federalprovincial relations and powers. Lack of legislative change in this area contributed to the
development of a key barrier that would later impede implementation of the policy changes
under consideration: the federal government simply lacked the authority to undertake
appropriate actions.
2008 Listeriosis outbreak reforms tested
Although the reforms following SARS were not as far reaching as some had hoped
for, they were, nonetheless, significant and well-funded, owing to SARS’ role as a focusing
event. Five years after the SARS outbreak, these reforms were put to the test as Canada was
again host to another public health emergency. In 2008, an outbreak of listeriosis arose as a
result of contamination by the listeria bacterium at a Maple Leaf Foods meat packing plant in
Toronto. This would become, according to investigator Sheila Weatherill, “one of the worst
foodborne illness emergencies in Canadian history” (Weatherill 2009).
Foodborne illness response, just like pandemic response, is marked by a similar set
of complex intergovernmental relations. This area of response is also a prime example of
fragmented horizontal as well as vertical governance structures. The federal department of
Health Canada develops policies and standards for the nutritional composition, quality, and
safety of food. In addition, Health Canada works with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency
(CFIA) to produce legislation regarding food inspection in tandem with other federal
departments such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and Agriculture and Agri-Food
Canada. Furthermore, provincial-territorial and federal governments both carry out food
inspection and the roles of local governmental organizations (municipalities, regional health
authorities, and local health units) vary across the country (Gabler 2008).
Federalism remained a key issue and an underlying factor in the ineffectual
implementation of the proposed changes. As in the case of SARS, many of the same
challenges arose and yet, in spite of the reforms and added safeguards, Canada’s public health
systems were again criticized for their inability to clarify roles and responsibilities between
the almost fifty local, provincial, and federal partners who were involved in the response.
According to a major report commissioned by the Government of Canada, “no single
organization took the overall role of coordinating the actions of various parties involved.” As
a result, a “vacuum in senior leadership” was created, causing “confusion and weak decisionmaking” (Weatherill 2009).
Many Canadians were clearly concerned and affected by the notable absence of
leadership. During the crisis, both the provincial and federal governments and the private
company implicated issued their own news announcements. There was confusion regarding
why the Chief Public Health Officer - head of PHAC and an individual responsible to report
to the Minister of Health - was not providing the leading national voice as intended following
the post-SARS reforms (Wilson and Keelan 2008). According to the Weatherill report, such
a multiplicity of authorities fueled misunderstanding and anxiety and prevented Canadians
from understanding which level of government was in charge of the crisis. Once again,
jurisdictional ambiguity severely hindered emergency response and resulted in an ill-
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coordinated effort marked by poor communication to the public.
The Weatherill report noted further significant shortcoming in the federal
government’s attempts to manage the crisis. An intergovernmental agreement detailing best
practices for the handling of foodborne outbreaks was in existence, having been ratified by
federal and provincial-territorial governments in 2004, but few of those involved with the
listeriosis outbreak were even familiar with the agreement, titled the “Foodborne Illness
Outbreak Response Protocol” and it was never formally activated during the crisis. While
the need for intergovernmental cooperation was recognized in the same report, a lack of
tangible and sustained measures ensured that jurisdictional ambiguity persisted once the
outbreak occurred.
Criticisms regarding poor central organization were particularly disappointing in
light of the newly minted reforms. The expenditures needed to create PHAC in the wake of
SARS were justified to the public on the basis that the new federal agency would play a key
role in the management of public health emergencies. However, PHAC had not yet provided
the necessary clarification of roles and responsibilities that it had been tasked with and a
further round of blame, excuses and obfuscation ensued.
2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak: confirming fears
As we have outlined, the SARS and listeriosis outbreaks renewed concerns about
federal-provincial coordination of emergency planning and highlighted severe weaknesses in
both responses. In 2009, Canada was host to another public health crisis: the H1N1 influenza
outbreak. This provided a further test and another opportunity to adapt and improve.
In April 2009, an outbreak of an influenza-like illness occurred in Mexico. The
Centre for Disease Control in the United States reported seven cases of a novel A/H1N1
influenza. Shortly thereafter, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared H1N1 a
pandemic. There was speculation that the new virus might result in illness and death on a
massive scale and cripple global trade. To put it bluntly, “it was feared that the H1N1
pandemic of 2009 was the next Spanish Flu” (Bretscher et al. 2010). By early February 2010,
Canada had 33,477 cases of H1N1 and 348 deaths had been caused by the outbreak (CHICA
2010). Public response to the government’s actions was exceedingly negative. As Maclean’s
reported: “most Canadians have reached the same conclusion: the country’s public health
authorities – federal, provincial, and local – have failed us miserably” (Friscolanti and Guilli
2009).
The vast majority of the problems experienced during the H1N1 outbreak occurred
in relation to the rollout of the vaccine, which again illustrated the problem of shared and
ambiguous responsibilities. The inoculation campaign intended to lessen the impact of the
virus in fact exposed major inconsistencies across provinces and regions, poor
implementation, and no national standards. To contextualize this discussion, it is worth
noting that all vaccination plans were limited because there were ongoing problems with
supply shortfalls that resulted from production limitations at GlaxoSmithKlein, the company
responsible for manufacturing Canada’s H1N1 vaccines. As a result, most of the provinces
and territories waited on delayed shipments of the vaccine, many of which arrived with
substantially fewer doses than promised.
Amid shortages of the H1N1 vaccine, equitable distribution of the vaccines became a
prime concern, and this was where the federal government failed in its attempts to deal with
the situation. News reports criticized the inoculation campaign’s relative lack of national
standards. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) reported that, the H1N1
inoculation campaign exemplified a “patchwork” of varying provincial, municipal, and even
regional regimes. There was “precious little in the way of consistency or uniformity in terms
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of rolling out the vaccine from one coast to another” (McKenna 2009).
A particularly controversial example of the lack of uniformity occurred in the
Canadian province of Alberta. Amid supply shortfalls, the Public Health Agency of Canada
determined that the vaccine should be rolled out on a priority basis, with those who would
benefit most to receive it first in order to minimize serious illness and overall death (Public
Health Agency of Canada 2010). However, during the H1N1 outbreak, the then Premier of
Alberta, Ed Stelmach, called Alberta the “province that is offering flu vaccines for every
Albertan, not just to the high-risk groups” (Friscolanti and Guilli 2009). This contradicted
PHAC’s stated strategy to provide doses to every province with the understanding that they
would be reserved for high-risk groups, in part to provide greater protection for the herd.
Premier Stelmach’s comments were indicative, however, of the independence and capacity
for inconsistent approaches that the provinces could take in the absence of more coercive,
national legislation or oversight – yet another result of federalism. A coordinated inoculation
regime did not occur. Instead, Canadian citizens across the country were provided with
varying levels of treatment according to where they lived.
In addition to the lack of national standards, inequity was also a key concern in
respect of which groups were entitled to receive the vaccine. Those groups considered to be
most at risk were instructed to go for their immunizations first, but in many instances little or
nothing was done to turn away low priority individuals who were determined to get their
“shots” early. High profile examples of queue jumping caused further outrage when it was
found that that board members of certain hospitals secured advanced access to the flu shots
and even some professional NHL hockey teams were given the vaccine early at their rinks
(Wingrove, Paperny, and Walton 2009), while at risk groups, including the elderly and the
very young, were expected to wait in the seemingly endless lines that formed each day.
Not only were people inconvenienced (or put off altogether) by standing in line for
several hours, but the system risked exposing healthy and at risk groups to those who were
already infected. Effective pandemic and infection control discourages large social
gatherings and require the sick to be isolated, but the vaccination procedure appeared to
violate both these measures and actually increased the likelihood of contagion.
The public and the media were highly critical of the way the immunization process
was handled and even the Chief Medical Officer of Ontario accepted that it was far from
satisfactory:
The picture, presented repeatedly by the media, of people lining up for hours
to get themselves and their children immunized was a disturbing one. It hinted
at possible widespread panic, and a system not able to cope. Neither of those
things, as it turned out, was true, but there is no question that the H1N1
immunization process could have been better handled. It boiled down to
problems of supply and capacity. (Ontario Chief Medical Officer, 2010, 13)
Although Ontario’s Chief Medical Officer of Health was prepared to acknowledge some of
the provincial failings in his report, federal ministers were adamant that they bore no
responsibility since health matters, including vaccinations, are a provincial matter.
When asked in an interview if Ottawa bears any blame for the flawed vaccine
rollout in Alberta, Manitoba and Ontario, which saw just over a third of their
populations inoculated against the pandemic virus, Health Minister Leona
Aglukkaq responded: “Provinces and territories deliver health care.”
(Alphonso 2012)
Provinces, on the other hand, argued that their planning was curtailed by a lack of
clarity regarding the quantity of vaccine they would receive each week from the federal
government. As a result of the constant jurisdictional squabbling and intergovernmental “turf
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wars,” Alphonso believes the public “grew impatient, confused and eventually turned off
from the vaccine,” which may help explain why the take up rates in some provinces was less
than a third (2012). The next section explores these themes further in the context of possible
reforms.
ANALYSIS: THEMES FOR PUBLIC HEALTH REFORM
The three infectious outbreaks studied, and the numerous inquiries they triggered,
highlight three central themes for public health reform in Canada. First, the case studies
signify the need to develop coordinated and cooperative intergovernmental relationships. As
Bretscher et al. conclude, “[t]he SARS crisis demonstrated that all orders of government
needed to develop an integrated and effective pandemic plan, while putting the appropriate
institutions in place to deal with a future crisis” (2010).
Despite investments in public health that were made in the wake of SARS, ongoing
challenges of intergovernmental cooperation have not fully been addressed and, as such, there
remains a gap between policy and practice in this area of public health reform. In spite of
cooperative rhetoric and several new institutions, federalism continues to promote and sustain
jurisdictional ambiguity in emergency response and provides fundamental barriers that
remain firmly entrenched in spite of a decade of reform and considerable investment.
Analysis of these three case studies highlights a number of barriers faced: imperfect
coordination and those in authority were unable to demand compliance – in particular due to
a lack of enforceable federal oversight under current emergency management protocol. These
problems, however, have their roots in federalism and its resultant system of diffuse
responsibility and a multiplicity of actors and agents. What is perhaps most interesting is that
reforms such as the creation of PHAC and the pan-Canadian Public Health Network reflect
the knowledge that intergovernmental cooperation is imperative. However, efforts to
facilitate and institutionalize cooperation remain largely ineffectual in the absence of
intergovernmental negotiations to further clarify roles and responsibilities. Jurisdictional
ambiguity, and a seeming lack of ability to address the constitutional authority for public
health, is an ongoing concern as failure to confront the broader jurisdictional aspects ensures
that emergency response will continue to undermine the institutional and procedural reforms
that have been undertaken.
Second, the case studies demonstrate that while the involvement of local
governments is critical, there is a need for increased federal leadership and oversight in public
health emergencies. There are key elements of emergency response that necessitate strong
federal leadership: public health emergencies demand a rapid response, seamless integration
across the country, and tremendous resources. Pandemics such as SARS pose serious threats
to populations globally and not just within national borders. Any failure to appropriately
contain or limit the spread of an outbreak could have significant repercussions for neighboring
countries and beyond, which creates an added responsibility to respond effectively to public
health crises.
There are distinct advantages to a response led by the federal government: a single
representative body organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), a clear line
of accountability and responsibility, a coordinating body, and a strong resource base that can
be engaged at short notice including the military and scientists. Under the rules of the WHO,
reporting responsibility for disease outbreaks rests with the national government. Ottawa’s
delay in reporting new cases to the WHO headquarters in Geneva resulted in a lack of timely
information from Ontario, undermining confidence that the situation was under control and
ultimately prompting the WHO to issue a travel advisory against travelling to Toronto
(Branswell 2013).
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Effective communication within the country, to citizens and government
representatives alike, also requires a well-defined federal role. Effective communication with
the public is critically important to managing an outbreak. As Bretscher et al. (2010) point
out, maintaining the trust of the media and general public is crucially important to ensure
compliance with public health measures. In order to establish trust, the government’s
response to an emergency must appear to be effective, credible and orderly. In each of the
three cases we analyzed, the sharing of responsibility for communication between different
levels of government and various agencies appeared to undermine trust and confidence
through the provision of different, and often contradictory, advice and information. SARS
and H1N1, in particular, revealed major weaknesses in inter-jurisdictional communication,
and highlighted the need for better local, national and international reporting and
communication.
Third, there is a need for continued economic investments in public health. Clearly,
the lack of vaccine supplies (as witnessed in the H1N1 case) not only increases the risks of
the virus spreading but also engenders a sense of panic among the public. While governments
may not be able to purchase or store sufficient vaccines, even if they exist, they need to ensure
that they are distributed in a timely fashion and target the highest-risk groups first.
Although we, and a number of the reports cited, argue for more investment in public
health and emergency preparedness, this has to be managed wisely if benefits are to be
realized and public support for further investment is to be maintained. A number of issues
came to light in the case studies, suggesting resources had not been managed appropriately.
For example, it transpired that one of the reasons for the shortage of the H1N1 flu vaccine
was the federal government’s decision to negotiate a sole sourced contract with a single
Quebec-based supplier. Such an approach to procurement is inconsistent with practices
adopted in the United States and even inconsistent with Canada’s approach to the production
of seasonal (rather than pandemic) flu vaccines, where multiple suppliers are utilized in order
to guard against the impact of a problem experienced in a single manufacturing site.
Procurement must focus on strategic health needs rather than regional, economic, industrial
or other criteria.
The efficiency and effectiveness of public health policies can also be undermined by
mis-management and corruption. Following the SARS outbreak in Toronto, the province of
Ontario invested heavily in developing electronic medical records establishing the “eHealth”
agency. However, by 2009 there was little to show for the investment and Ontario Auditor
General “slammed” the province for spending more than $1 billion at eHealth and its
predecessor agency, Smart Systems for Health Agency. Describing it as the “worst case of
rule-breaking that he had ever seen” the Auditor General found that: procurement policies
were circumvented to allow sole sourcing for outside consultants; board members were
deceived and former CEO Sarah Kramer operated with virtually no accountability (Greenberg
2009). The scandal led to the resignation of a Liberal Minister, but could not alter the fact
that after nearly a decade of sizeable investment the province was still years away from being
able to rollout electronic health records.
The full significance of the eHealth scandal would soon be revealed by the H1N1
outbreak which demonstrated how crucial electronic health records are to effective
immunization programs. The absence of a medical database was later identified as a major
factor in the confusion and mayhem that accompanied Ontario’s long line-ups for vaccine.
As Ontario’s Chief Medical Officer for Health confirmed, the need for a database and
improved technology is pressing:
[We] do not have the capacity to track and manage an immunization program.
I am absolutely suggesting that on this, we can do better. The technology exists
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today. It is a pan-Canadian solution called Panorama that has been in
development since after SARS. There have been numerous delays to ensure the
system can be adapted to the needs of all provinces and territories. The time is
right to move forward. There must be no more delays. Panorama will allow us
to track who is getting immunized and when. It will help us with surveillance
so we can be ready to respond to outbreaks of disease. It will improve
administration, workflow and overall efficiency. It will give us a 21st century
tool for dealing with pandemics in the 21st century (Ontario Chief Medical
Officer of Health 2010).
Further challenges face governments looking to manage resources efficiently. In
times of health crises, governments are faced by both responsibility and public pressure to
provide all available treatments, and must make evidence-based decisions regarding an
appropriate course of action. This is the case with the flu drug oseltamivir (Tamiflu) that has
been used increasingly in pandemic situations and has become the focus of recent debates
about the costs of emergency preparedness. Tamiflu, it should be noted, is not intended to be
a substitute for the flu vaccine. Instead, it is an antiviral drug (“neuraminidase inhibitor”) that
is claimed to shorten recovery times and help reduce the symptoms of influenza. However,
there is ongoing debate about the evidence base for this class of drugs, with Cochrane
Collaboration research concluding that effectiveness against the symptoms of influenza is
modest and that efficacy against complications (i.e. pneumonia) or transmission has not been
proven (Jefferson et al. 2009). Especially concerning for policymakers, independent efforts
to assess the current evidence on treatments of oseltamivir for influenza are limited by a
paucity of crucial evidence and a lengthy history of unwillingness regarding Tamiflu producer
Roche’s release of crucial data, even in light of a campaign spearheaded by the prominent
British Medical Journal (Cochrane Collaboration 2012).2
However, in spite of the fact that medical evidence about the efficacy of
neuraminidase inhibitors is mixed, governments around the world have invested billions of
dollars in order to stockpile oseltamivir. In Canada alone the government has more than $18million (CAD) worth of Tamiflu in federal and provincial warehouses. Tamiflu, like all drugs,
has a limited shelf-life. Health officials thus have an ongoing obligation to decide on the
value of spending public dollars to restock antiviral drugs in case of a future pandemic
(Alphonso 2012). This task is complicated, if not compromised, by the limited evidence and
increased prevalence of reports that some senior public health officials and “independent”
medical advisors receive payment and benefits from the makers of Tamiflu which have been
surfacing in the popular press (CBC News 2012).
A recent audit of PHAC suggests that Tamiflu is just one aspect in a bigger problem
of stockpiling. The agency has a national emergency stockpile with an estimated value of
$300 million which is stored at 10 federal warehouses and 1,300 supply centres throughout
2

The Cochrane Collaboration continues to cite concerns about the availability of evidence
from the producers, Roche. In 2009, Roche made a public commitment to share full study
data with investigators. After the release of the updated Cochrane review in January 2012,
for which this full data was still not available, the British Medical Journal launched the
Open Data Campaign, which “aims to achieve appropriate and necessary independent
scrutiny of data from clinical trials.” Focused on Tamiflu as its first initiative, the Open
Data Campaign may subsequently may help ensure access to the data Roche has not
fulfilled its obligation to share.
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Canada (Kennedy 2010). However, the audit states that “mandate and strategic objectives”
of the stockpile requires “clarification” because the system dates back to civil defence risks
stemming from the Cold War and lacks proper maintenance and management (Kennedy
2010).
The optics of inefficiency matter, particularly in times of austerity. Effective public
health measures do not come cheap. The total costs of the H1N1 response in Canada are
estimated to be about $2billion (CAD). Stockpiling resources for events that may never
happen, and will more than likely never be used, will always prompt difficult questions about
efficiency and effectiveness. Nevertheless, in order to continue funding on the scale required,
the public needs to see tangible improvements in public health capacity, procedures to assess
efficacy and ensure evidence-based decision-making, and outcomes and feel confident that
the country is well prepared and that resources have been utilized in a responsible manner.
CONCLUSION
Missed opportunities and the prospects for reform
The threat of new airborne infections is ever-present, and requires vigilance and
preparation to minimize loss of life and serious illness. The economic costs of pandemics
can also be devastating to cities and national economies. With the SARS outbreak in Toronto,
for example, Bretscher et al. (2010) estimate that direct health costs to the province of Ontario
were approximately $945 million (CAD), the long-term impact on tourism cost the industry
over $700 million (CAD) and, despite being geographically concentrated in Toronto, SARS
resulted in a 1% – 1.5% decline in the third quarter GDP (2003) growth. They conclude that
the message for governments is clear: emergency planning and effectively dealing with a
pandemic crisis is critically important to protect human lives, and the economy as a whole
(Bretscher et al. 2010).
In its damning assessment of Canada’s response to SARS, the Campbell Report
concluded that, “there was an obvious breakdown of communication” between the federal and
provincial governments that, if not addressed in the future, would place Canadians at greater
risk of infectious disease and make the country “look like fools in the international
community” (Campbell 2004). Anyone who witnessed the subsequent fiasco of the H1N1
pandemic would have to concur with Campbell’s harsh but fair assessment.
In spite of the opportunities that SARS and subsequent public health threats have
provided for learning and adaptation, analysis of the three most recent outbreaks suggests that
while lessons have been learned, and some improvements made, little has been done in the
Canadian context to address the fundamental barriers impeding effective emergency
preparedness and response. It seems that the institutional barriers to change, and to the
necessary clarification of roles and responsibilities, have been too significant in a federalist
nation. In assessing prospects for future crises and reform, it is hard not to think that a rare
opportunity for substantive change in the wake of the SARS crisis has been missed.
Moreover, in 2013, the prospects for improved intergovernmental cooperation and alignment
have deteriorated in recent years due to a combination of political, economic and, social
factors.
In 2005, shortly after the SARS outbreak, the Canadian Prime Minister Stephen
Harper articulated his vision of “open federalism” as an approach to intergovernmental
relations composed of four key aspects: ‘‘a recognition and a respect for the constitutional
division of powers; a recognition that there exists a fiscal imbalance in the federation; a
commitment to redress this vertical fiscal imbalance; a related commitment to rein in the
federal spending power in areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction; and, finally, a
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commitment to work with the Council of the Federation to improve the management and
workings of the Canadian federation’’ (Courchene 2008, 19).
Despite the pressing need for a re-envisioning of intergovernmental relations and the
need for a stronger federal role in the sphere of public health, Prime Minister Harper’s
embrace and promotion of “open federalism” and “small government”, reinforced by an
increasingly restricted fiscal environment, have diminished significantly the prospects for a
stronger and expanded federal role in emergency management. This supports Fierlbeck’s
assessment that “federal inaction in public health has become exacerbated
contemporaneously with a commitment to open federalism” (2010, 17). Harper’s reluctance,
and to some extent inability, to take a strong national leadership role in public health and
other important sectors such as infrastructure and transportation, is why open federalism has
also been dubbed “absentee federalism”.
While “open” federalism may constitute an appropriate political philosophy for
conceptualizing federalism in the abstract, it has potentially dangerous implications for the
very real challenges and practicalities of dealing with emergency situations when strong
leadership and firm decisive action is required. Ontario’s Chief Medical Officer of Health
expressed this point powerfully in his report following the H1N1 pandemic:
We also need to extend our chain of command to the local level. The system as
it is presently constructed does many things well in what I will refer to as
“peace time.” In “war time,” however, when people are getting sick and people
are getting scared, the health system needs to accommodate the kind of strong
central oversight and management that currently doesn’t exist. The Chief
Medical Officer of Health must have the authority to direct public health units
in real time as he or she sees fit. That authority didn’t exist during this
pandemic. I or my successor needs to have it the next time around (2010).
Without a determined federal commitment to assume a stronger role, it is difficult
to see how jurisdictional barriers to change will be addressed, particularly as the provinces
continue to cherish their independence and are generally unwelcoming of, as many see it,
federal “incursions” into provincial affairs.
Perhaps the greatest pressure for Canada to find a solution to this problem will come
from beyond Canada’s borders. Not only are new and more deadly pandemic threats likely to
emerge in the near future, but, Canada is also under pressure to improve its leadership and
information sharing because of new regulations from the WHO. As of 2012, new binding
International Health Regulations (IHRs) came into effect. Most notably, the IHRs imposed
upon Canada (as well as all other member states) new obligations in health surveillance and
management of emergencies. Under the IHRs, Canada is under an obligation to report to the
WHO any case within Canada’s border that qualifies as a public health emergency of
international concern and must communicate with the WHO from a single national office.
According to McDougall, cooperation between all levels of government is “evidently critical”
if Canada is to meet the requirements of the new IHRs. The most recent NAPAPI plan may
also pressure the Canadian, Mexican and US governments into taking a stronger national lead
in order to fulfill their international obligations to work together to coordinate a North
American pandemic response. However it remains to be seen how seriously national
governments will take commitments to cooperate and share resources when faced with a
major outbreak and the domestic public and political pressures that will inevitably accompany
it.
SARS was thought to be the event that focused Canadians on the need to reform
public health and provided an opportunity to ensure vital systems were up to task for this and
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future public health threats. Instead, it became the “wake up call that was never answered”
(McDougall 2009, 34). Ten years later, as public and media fears of avian flu and other
pandemic threats have waned, the opportunity to learn from SARS and adapt for subsequent
emergencies appears to have diminished also. A combination of international pressure, a
change in government and/or political ideology and an improving economic situation may
gradually re-open a window for substantive change. Ironically, it is, of course, another badly
mishandled public health crisis that may, devastatingly, provide the greatest impetus for
change, at potentially great cost to the health, wellbeing, and economic development of the
population.
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